The individual exposed to " humanis ti c" and "behavioristic" literature throughout his university schooling, whether in psychology or ed ucation, may after each successive exposure to one particular school reflect, " I agree with that." The inconsistency o f find ing ground for agreement in two supposed ly different schools of thought concerni ng th e nature of what Is meaningful In the examination and understanding of man, eventually will, or should, create a tension that needs to be resolved.
The debate as rivat techniques
At prese nt when the referents "behaviorism" and "humanism" come up in discussion they are usually In the form of the adjectives: " behavioristic" and " humanistic." In other words, the bulk of the literature we read is not so much concerned with the theory or philosophical bases of these two schools of thought but rather the techniques which claim to be derived from them. Our concentration is on technique. For behaviorists the d iscussion might cen· ter around the merits of programmed instruction, using a machine versus the use o f books and teachers, or the most appropriate techniques for classroom management. In the humanist camp, particularly in the area of Individual development, the discussion might center around the relative merits of the " sensitivity train in g" or the "en· counter" approach, vs. the "T·Group" approach. These group counseling techniques are usually the method of In· tervention preferred by humanist counselors.
With this focus on technique the issue as to who has the most effective technology is raised. Educators and psychologists of the behavioral persuasion usually fee l that they have an advantage here. Because they are con· tent to focus on, and attempt to measure only behavior, they can offer fai rly conclusive evidence for the el· !activeness of their work. (eg . The client' s fetishistic reac· tion either persisted or it didn' t.) Behavioris ts like to point to the dearth of convincing studies pointing to ef· fectiveness of group growth experiences, the main tool of the humanists. Campbell and Dunnell (1968) and Smith (1975) have published in the Psychological Bulletin two of the most comprehensive and rigorous reviews. To grossly paraphrase: Campbell and Ounnett find some changes In behavior, but virtually no evidence which Is satisfactory to them, regard ing the effectiveness of T-group experiences o n managerial personnel relative to their organizational roles; Smith reviewed studies on the outcome of sensitivity training and after culling out numerous studies which didn't obtain measures from controls, which didn"t use a repeated measures design, and which didn't satisfy a minimal time duration, was able to find a group of 100 powerful studies, only seventy-eight of which detected significant predicted changes in behavior.
Behaviorists would argue that in view of this literature one has to work rather hard to find convincing evidence for the effectiveness of humanistlcally orientated techniques. ls this a problem to the humanist?
No! At this point the hu manist returns to the definit ion of his field. Humanists right from the beginning had, almost in anticipation, set up a defense. This defense might be called "engulf and devour" eclecticism. The basis of this strategy is contained In any definition of humanist psychology one might like to review. Here Is that provided by Cohen in Hans Eyslnck's Encyclopedia of Psychology, 1972. "It" (humanistic psychology) " does not deny the validity o f any psychological work with sound credentials, in theory and method. It insists, hOwever (and this is its distinctive feature), that a comprehensive psychology of man cannot be delimited by particular methods (experimental or s tatistical), any more than a cartographer can omit oceans or mountain ranges merely because he can· not traverse the former or scale the latter."
This definition by its breadth actually allows the in· clusion of behaviorism:" ... does not deny the validity of any psyohOlogical work with sound credentials." Humanists seeming ly are not denying the validity of focusing on overt behavior as a basis of analysis for predicting future behavior but they are implying that there is more to human behavior than this element alone.
The debate as phllosphical differences
Where then do the differences lie, as there are in fact differences. and what led to this rather messy state of af· fairs? Interestingly, the fundamental distinction between behaviorism and humanism is philosophical and Is revealed when one examines the problem of knowledge: (i.e. what is knowledge?).
" Empiricism" and " rationalism" are two major OP· posing positions in the argument concern ing the relation· ship botween experience and the organ ization of the mind. Hilgard and Bower (1975) makes the distinction very nicely. To paraphrase: The British Empiricists in llne with the positivism of Comte developed a doctrine that knowledge was derived through sensory experience. Com· plex ideas were constructed of simpler ideas and these In turn cou ld further be reduced. They believed that the mind was li ke a machine built ou t of simple components each in an additive relationship to the next. They also believed that ideas were connected through the action of association or contig uity in experience.
In contrast the European rationalists, Descantes, Leibniz and Kant argued that reason alone rather than sense data. spiritual revelation or any other source was the basis of knowledge. They also argued that certain types of knowledge were a priori.
Empi ricism was very powerful in the history of the rebellion of psychology against philosophy. In this rebellion empirical research attempted to render obsolete any speculations about the nature of the universe. This tradition starts with Ebbinghaus and Thorndyke, In the 188-0's and 90' s and has continued in the 20th Century with Pavlov, Watson and Skinner. Meditations and In· tro spectlons on the nature of the soul, the psyche, the mind and so on were replaced by observations and ex· perimen ts concerning the behavior of living organisms, In· eluding human beings. Without this work, psychology, un· der the influence of such as Titchener, could have remained the asylum for philosophical meditation forever.
It Is clear that the empiricist tradition gave impetus to this development. Empiricism's notions, particularly that of association Ism, are fundamental to the concepts of the "law of effect" , Guthrie's contiguity theory of learning and classical and operant conditioning. However, rationalism has received considerable support for the notions of a priori knowledge from psychologists working on per· ceptual development and depth perception (Hllgard and Bower, t975, p. 8) . Associationism is also an inadequate principle to use when explaining the " well·formedness" o f most speech In-puts and out-puts. Associationlsm allows for no mechanism by which the individual can sort out a " word salad" from a meaningful sentence.
14 The debate as It is now presented is essentially be· tween behaviorally orientated and cognitively and per· ceptually orientated psychologists who_ both utilize the empirical approach to knowledge embodied In _ the _p_res~nt day hypothetlco-deductive model of sc1ent1f1c . on· vestigation. Given their differences I n ph1losoph1cat origin, it is understandable that professional quar~els OC· cur as to the adequacy of their respective explanatoons for behavior. Humanist psychologists, however, aren't usually associated with cognitive or _Perc. epti?n research, so having rejected the commonly 1mpl1ed 1nclus1on of behaviorism by human ism and poin ted to the phi losophical gap between behaviorism and one of the derivatives of rationalism, cognitive psychology, where does this leave us in our examination of the differences between behaviorism and humanism?
Humanist psychology and ideology
A closer look at the literature of humanistic psychology seems to indicate that the substantive di!· ference is actually political.
Charles Hampden-Turner' s boOk Radical Man (1970) is probably the best researched and documented presentation of the contemporary human istic position. In Radical Man Hampden-Turner develops three themes: a critique of current social scientific philosophy and the research 1 t generates, his own model of man, and the application of that model in the analysis of contemporary social set· tings. The empiricism and pos!tlvlsm which _is so ex· trovertedly displayed by behaviorists such as Skinner, and the structural-functionali sm found in the sociology of Talcott Parsons and Radcllff·Brown is seen by Hampden· Turner as essentially conservative In lu_nction .. Man is· examined as he is and the causes for hos cond ition d1sected. By studying man in this fashion a sanctification of the status quo takes place, which is only a shOrt step_ from saying "this is the way ii will be" or " this 1s the way 1t has to be". Thus for Hampden-Turner the image of man im· plicit in the practice of science is that of an atomized, depersonalized, determined man.
Hampden-Turner' s work was a product of the sixties. The sixties were a well-spring for humanism and typically Hampden-Turner provides us with an alte'!'ative _image of man: A man with a " synthesizing capacity which turns brain input into novel output, a man with a symbolizing and exploring capacity, and a man who engages '". a model of pscyho-social development such that thro~gh in· vestment of his own "authenticity" and through risking himself he achieves higher "synergy."
. Unfortunately for Hampden-Turner he uses as evidence for his model o f man the effectiveness of T-Group training, an effectiveness we have. already _ seen is somewhat doubtful. This tends to add little veracity to the model. Also while the practice of social science in· vcstigation does often produce a rather dismal pi_cture as humanists like Hampden-Turner point out, this is by no means a result of the epistemology on which it is based. Indeed this argument is a basic weak~ess o f the humanist position . A behaviorally oriented social scientist can ha~e a utopian goal for man, even II Walden II Is not everyone s idea of utopia.
The organism and behaviorism
We have observed that cognitive and perceptual psychOlogy are the natural heirs to . rationalism while humanist psychology is a s tep child as 11 Is m~>r~ of a pol1t· lcal doctrine rather than a psychological d1sc 1 phne. It now seems only fair to see If behaviori sm also has feet of clay. II does. The problem is not philosophica l, rather it concerns assumption s abo ut the subject being studied. Herrnstein (1977) argues thal Sklnnerlan behaviorism, in its efforts to demonstrate the control o f its techno logy over behavior, made a number of assumptions wh ich down .played the role o f the organism. An Implicit assumption was that of equlpotentlallty, that any response and reinforcer and any conditioned s timulus and unconditioned stimulus can be associated equally well. Seligman (1970) suggests degree o f " preparedness" as an alternative concept because some responses are simp ly more " natural" to the animal than others. For example, pigeons more readily peck for food relnforcers than peck for shock avoidance.
Ski nner makes a great deal out of the notion that the taught responses of this animal are " arbitrary." They are not necessari ly natural to the animal and the reinforcer is not linked directly to the response. That is, the animal might lever-press for totally different reinforcement consequences-food, drink, escape, etc. However, Skinnerian psychologists have to specify both the range of dimensions of the stimulus and the response. As it turns out, they do this in terms of "natural lines of fractur e." These natur al lines of fracture depend on the physical measures of the stimulus and response, the contingencies of reinfo rcement (how much change In stimulus will produce the respo nse and at what point changes In the response mode wi ll cons titute a change in the response), and the characteris tics o f the organism ii· sell. Commercial animal trainers Breland and Breland (1961) were among the first to point out the contamination of response classes by their relnforcers. Racoons. in· dulged in washing behavior with coins they had to collect for rei nforcement and pigs rooted with the coins under a similar contingency. These organisms clearly have pred ispositions to c ertain behavi oral routines. This challenges the notion of equlpotenti a llt y and in terms of this evidence the consideration o f natur al lines of fracture in a response is in itself a contradiction o f the notion of ar. bitrariness.
Closely tied to the above argument is the Skinnerian no tion of drive. For him drive might be defi ned as a particular ctass of classes of behavior. The covariation in these classes and their relnforcers makes the concept necessary even for Skinner. These drives are commonly referred to as hunger, thirst , sex , etc. and behaviorists usually assume that they are few in number. As a con· sequence, they are argued to have salience in a very wide range of situations. The excessive concern with these few primary drives has diverted attention from the reinforcing nature of a behavior performed wit hout an external reinforcer. II is interesting to note that sexual gratification is in essence not the presence of the partner but the ex· perience of internal gratification, a consequence o f sexuat behaviors. The reinforcer is behavior, not an object.
If a response is self-reinforcing then it can't also be arbitrary. Herrnestein (1977) urges that academic psychologist studying animal behavior must look more to ethology if they wish to have a greater understanding of behavior' s intrinsic power to reinforce.
Every school pupil has been told that speech and language are what make our species unique. It is interesting that It is in thi s specific behavior that Skinner's operant model experiences Its greatest problems of prediction and has had its plauslblllty come into most WINTER, 1978 doubt when compared with more trad itional nativlst or organism oriented views (Chomsky, 1959 , Lenneburg, 1969 .
Enter the counselor
This state of affairs leaves the counse l or in an exciting position . If he desires he can freely adopt the ideology of humanism and the techn iques and methods of analysis derived from bo th cognitive personality theories and behaviorism. Indeed Lazarus (1977) argues that even among " behavior therapists" "only a few die-hards would not ag ree that the stimulus-res ponse 'learning theory' basis of behavior therapy is passe and that a distinctly cognitive orientation now prevails."
The reat world of human suffering has forced clinicians together at a time when theorists are prepared to acknowledge the deficiencies in their respective analyses. Mahoney (1977) observes that in the 1960's the "Insig ht-or iented" therapists were frustrated because they couldn't induce change and the behavior therapists were frustrated because of the restric tiveness of their theory and technology.
The new hybrid Is the cognitive or soclal·learnlng trend now developing in psychotherapy. Its origins are In the thought management programs of Carneg ie (194'3 ) and Peal (1960) . Later Rotter (1954) , Kelly (1955) and Bandu ra (1961 , 1973) produced academic publications. Interestingly, Eiiis's (1962 Eiiis's ( , 1975 ) rational·emotiv e therapy gained popular support before it achieved any professional respectability . In therapy there are three primary objec tives: 1) perceptual sk ill s, 2) performance skills and 3) associative skills. The client is taught to examine his environment and lo analyze his thoughts and emotions about It. He Is also taught to evaluate his associations; that Is, his ex· pectancies and perceived contingencies, and he Is taught the relationship between his c og nitions and his per· formance and emotions. Goals are set and behaviors and outcomes noted and monitered by the therapi st.
The counselor Is presently freed from having to label himself, and what has been al times something o f a tiresome debate has been largely resolved, leavlng him free to pursue the broadest and most effective approach with his clien t.
Summary
To the extent that humanist and cognitive psychologies share the same philosophical base they can be reconciled with behaviorism in social learning theory.
Growth of Knowledge
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The growth of knowledge might be l ikened to an expanding balloon, with the volume of ai r inside the balloon representing the known and the skin of the balloon marking the boundary between the known and the unknown. As the volume of the known increases, so does the surface area of the balloon-the extent of the boundary be· tween the known and unknown-so that the more we see, the more we see there is to see.
John Gribbin in White Holes, Cosmic Gushers In t he Universe p. 4. Delacorte Press, 1977 . 
